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A B S T R A C T
IT-security experts engage in behavior-based malware analysis in order to learn about pre-
viously unknown samples of malicious software (malware) or malware families. For this,
they need to find and categorize suspicious patterns from large collections of execution traces.
Currently available systems do not meet the analysts’ needs which are described as: visual
access suitable for complex data structures, visual representations appropriate for IT-
security experts, provision of workflow-specific interaction techniques, and the ability to
externalize knowledge in the form of rules to ease the analysis process and to share with
colleagues. To close this gap, we designed and developed KAMAS, a knowledge-assisted vi-
sualization system for behavior-based malware analysis. This paper is a design study that
describes the design, implementation, and evaluation of the prototype. We report on the
validation of KAMAS with expert reviews, a user study with domain experts and focus group
meetings with analysts from industry. Additionally, we reflect on the acquired insights of
the design study and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the applied visualiza-
tion methods. An interesting finding is that the arc-diagram was one of the preferred
visualization techniques during the design phase but did not provide the expected ben-
efits for finding patterns. In contrast, the seemingly simple looking connection line was
described as supportive in finding the link between the rule overview table and the rule
detail table which are playing a central role for the analysis in KAMAS.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Malware (malicious software) is undoubtedly one of today’s
greatest threats to the Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability (CIA)
triangle of information security (Stoneburner et al., 2002). It
has become a common tool in digital theft, corporate and na-
tional espionage, spam distribution and attacks on infrastructure
availability. When security professionals analyze malware in
a real world setting, they have large volumes of complex and
heterogeneous data at their disposal. In behavior-basedmalware
analysis, they explore traces of malware execution in the form
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of system call sequences (rules) and frequently occurring sub-
sequences of potentially malicious code (Egele et al., 2008).Their
workflow involves the tasks of selecting different rules, cat-
egorizing them, and storing them in a database as well as
manual adaption and/or tuning of found rules (Wagner et al.,
2014). In addition to challenging analysis methods, “implicit
knowledge” (Chen et al., 2009) or “tacit knowledge” (Wang et al.,
2009) about the data, the domain experience or prior experi-
ence are often required to make sense of the data and not
become overwhelmed. By externalizing some of the domain
experts’ implicit knowledge, it can be made available as ex-
plicit knowledge and stored in a knowledge database (KDB)
(Chen et al., 2009).
In this paper, we present a visualization design study in the
context of malware analysis.Visualization tools “provide visual
representations of datasets designed to help people carry out
tasks more effectively” (Munzner, 2014). Thus, they are par-
ticularly useful “to augment human capabilities rather than
replace people with computational decision-making methods”
(Munzner, 2014). Malware analysis lends itself very well to vi-
sualization, because the experience of analysts plays a central
role in reconstructing the obfuscated behavior of malware.
Users’ needs in the context of behavior-based malware analy-
sis were analyzed systematically in previous work (Wagner et al.,
2014) and are summarized in Section 2. Currently, there are no
interactive visualization tools available which cover all the needs
of the malware analysis experts. To close this gap, we devel-
oped a novel Knowledge-Assisted Visual Malware Analysis
System (KAMAS) (see Fig. 1). Additionally, we demonstrate how
the visualization can benefit from explicit domain knowledge.
In order to achieve the best possible results, we followed the
paradigm of problem-oriented research, i.e., collaborating with
real users to solve their tasks (Sedlmair et al., 2012). Therefore,
we worked in accordance with the nested model for visualiza-
tion design and validation by Munzner (Munzner, 2009), which
divides visualization design into four levels combined with ap-
propriate validation methods (see Section 2). Specifically, we
focused on the third and fourth level of Munzner’s model
(Munzner, 2009) (third level: visual encoding and interaction
design, fourth level: algorithm design). Moreover, we evalu-
ated the prototype’s usability in relation to the interaction
metaphors and knowledge representation needed by IT-security
experts. Thus, the main contributions of our research are:
• We present the concept and implementation of KAMAS as
systematically designed, developed and evaluated instan-
tiation of an interactive visual method for handling large
amounts of complex data in behavior-based malware
analysis.
• We show that applying knowledge-assisted visual analyt-
ics methods allows domain experts to externalize their
implicit knowledge and profit from this explicit knowl-
edge in their analysis workflow.
• To provide evidence for the effectiveness of the developed
methods, we provide a rigorous and reproducible valida-
tion of the introduced techniques with malware analysis
experts.
This paper is organized as follows (see Fig. 2 for a graphi-
cal overview): Section 2 provides background information about
the problem domain and provides a summary of our previ-
ous work on problem characterization and abstraction in
relation to malicious software analysis. Section 3 presents
related work in problem-oriented visualization research,
malware analysis, and knowledge-assisted visualization. Section
4 provides a detailed description of our KAMAS prototype and
Section 5 demonstrates the application of KAMAS in a usage
scenario. Section 6 describes the used validation methods and
Fig. 1 – Screenshot of the KAMAS interface during the exploration of a cluster grammar that includes combined system and
API call sequences (rules) gathered during the execution of malicious software to find malicious subsequences (patterns).
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the associated results. Finally, Section 7 is a reflection on the
results of our research combined with the conclusion and future
work.
2. Background and problem characterization
Throughout our design study project, we followed the well-
known nested model for visualization design and validation as
proposed by Munzner (2009). This systematic approach splits
visualization design into four levels (domain problem and data
characterization, operation and data type abstraction, visual encod-
ing and interaction design, algorithm design) in combination with
corresponding evaluation methods. Our problem-oriented ap-
proach to the study of knowledge-assisted visualization systems
is based on our prior work (Wagner et al., 2014) which ana-
lyzed the needs of malware analysts in relation to their work
on behavior-basedmalware pattern analysis. For this, we started
with a problem characterization (Sedlmair et al., 2012) corre-
sponding to the first level of the nested model, whereby we
followed a three-step qualitative research approach includ-
ing systematic literature research, focus group meetings and
semi-structured interviews.
1. In the literature research (Section 3), it became apparent that
visualization methods are less common in currently avail-
able malware analysis approaches.
2. During focus group meetings with IT-security specialists,
we established a common understanding of their field of
work and their objectives. In addition, a number of possi-
bly applicable visualization techniques were discussed.
3. In the semi-structured interviews sessions, it was pos-
sible to identify preferred visual representation combinations
(e.g., multiple views (Gotz et al., 2012) and arc-diagram
(Wattenberg, 2002) or word tree (Wattenberg and Viegas,
2008)). Additionally, participants explained a number of cur-
rently available tools for the different work steps involved
in behavior-based malware analysis.
Based on the gained insights, we analyzed the data, the users
and the tasks in the problem domain using the data-users-
tasks analysis framework introduced by Miksch and Aigner
(Miksch and Aigner, 2014).This corresponds to the second level
of the nested model (operation and data type abstraction).
2.1. Domain problem and data characterization
There are basically two different approaches for the detec-
tion of malicious software: the signature-based and the
behavior-based approach (Dornhackl et al., 2014). Current
malware detection/classification systems commonly use a
signature-based approach which describes known malware by
simple patterns (e.g., defined by regular expressions) or its syn-
tactic characteristics (mostly bit strings) (Christodorescu et al.,
2008). In general, the signature-based detection approach has
several shortcomings (Christodorescu et al., 2008). On the one
hand, obfuscation techniques commonly utilize polymorphic
or metamorphic mutation to generate an ever-growing number
of malware variants,which are different in appearance but func-
tionally identical. On the other hand, signature-based
techniques can only detect already identified and analyzed
malware, otherwise they are overlooked. Since the signature-
based approach can be used only for known malware, other
techniques must be applied.
To overcome these shortcomings, the so-called behavior-
based approach can be used. Here, a sample’s activity is
analyzed during execution using dynamic analysis tech-
niques.These apply a previously defined set of rules to decide
whether a sample’s behavior is malicious. Behavioral analy-
sis is a promising approach for detecting and pre-classifying
malware: malware is not characterized by its syntactic ap-
pearance, but rather by its dynamic behavior.
Behavior-based malware recognition:Malicious behavior in
software is identified through static or dynamic analysis (Egele
et al., 2008). On the one hand, when statically analyzing a pos-
sibly malicious software sample, the binary file is usually
disassembled and dissected function by function. Dynamic
analysis, on the other hand, observes the sample’s behavior
directly (Egele et al., 2008): The supposed malware sample is
executed inside an isolated, sometimes virtualized labora-
tory environment, which is instrumented with selected data
providers, in order to generate a report (i.e. trace) of system
and API calls sequentially invoked by the sample. These data
providers are described in detail in Section 3 of a survey by
Wagner et al. (2015). Both approaches (static and dynamic analy-
sis) yield patterns and rules, which are later used for malicious
software detection and classification.
Pattern extraction process: The behavior pattern extrac-
tion process (see Fig. 3) is usually split into several stages
(Wagner et al., 2014) and can be based on different data pro-
viders (Wagner et al., 2015). Our collaborators cluster system
and API call traces using Malheur (Rieck, 2016) concatenate
traces of each cluster, and search patterns using the compres-
sion algorithm Sequitur (Nevill-Manning and Witten, 1997),
which results in a context-free grammar. The patterns found
are called “rules” by the collaborating domain experts, since
the rules are parts of a context-free grammar. A rule de-
scribes a sequence of system or API calls with a length from
Fig. 2 – Graphical overview of the KAMAS design study project reported in this paper.
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1 to n depending on the compression algorithm settings. The
Sequitur algorithm is a lossless compression algorithm, i.e., the
originally logged sequence of system and API calls can be re-
constructed from the cluster grammar. See Section 4 for more
details. A human analyst must then assess this grammar and
extract rules describing potentially relevant behavior.
Need for visualization: Here is where visualization is needed
to support the IT-security experts:The selection of relevant rules
relies heavily on the accessibility and readability of the ex-
tracted information. Once a relevant rule has been identified
by domain experts, it is stored in a pattern database. In the
pattern database, a rule is assigned to a specific task of the hi-
erarchical malicious behavior schema introduced by Dornhackl
et al. (2014). This schema describes different types of mali-
cious activities to enable the identification and the
categorization of malicious software based on its high-level
goals.
2.2. Terms and definitions
In this section we define terms related to the malware analy-
sis process (Fig. 3) (Dornhackl et al., 2014; Wagner et al., 2014):
Sample: An executable program that is assumed to be
malicious.
System and API call: The way a computer program re-
quests a service (a function) from the operating systems kernel
to be executed.
Trace: The behavioral execution logs of a sample in the
correct execution order, e.g., a sequence of system andAPI calls.
Cluster:A set of traces (log-files) of n related samples in one
file.
Cluster-grammar: The context-free grammar extracted by
the Sequitur algorithm from the cluster file.
Rule:A grammar element, i.e. a sequence of system and API
calls that occur in the generated cluster-grammar.
Task-grammar:An identified relevant rule, stored in the KDB
assigned to a task of the malicious behavior schema (Dornhackl
et al., 2014). The task-grammar is the foundation of the auto-
matically generated rules, which are used to detect malicious
behavior in newly loaded clusters.
KDB: The knowledge database storing the extracted im-
plicit knowledge of the IT-security experts as explicit knowledge
which is used for the automated analysis and visualization.
2.3. Operation and data type abstraction
Summarizing our results we could abstract the parse tree (the
data structure which specifies the result of pattern search) of
a cluster-grammar as a simple directed acyclic graph with
nominal data attributed to the nodes. They consist of indi-
vidual rules which in turn are composed of sequences of system
and API calls. These have a cardinality typically greater than
100. The users are malware analysts (domain experts) whose
main tasks are to select different rules, categorize them by their
task and store them in the database as well as manual adaption
and/or tuning of found rules (Wagner et al., 2014).
Based on these insights, we defined four key require-
ments (R) which have to be fulfilled by the KAMAS prototype:
R1 Data: Handling of complex data structures in behavior-
based malware analysis. To ensure the effective analysis of a
cluster-grammar, a large and complex data structure needs to
be modeled, stored, and analyzed. This includes detailed in-
formation about the contained rules (Wagner et al., 2014) in
the form of a directed acyclic graph with nominal attributes.
R2 Visual representation: Visual representations appropriate
for IT-security experts. For the most parts, analysts investigate
the collected data manually because the available tools do not
cover all of their needs. In a preliminary study, we found that
malware analysts preferred visualization concepts contain-
ing multiple views and arc-diagrams or word trees (Wagner
et al., 2014).
R3 Workflow: Workflow-specific interaction techniques. The
analysis workflow for behavior-based malware analysis con-
tains several preprocessing and analysis steps (see Fig. 3). In
relation to that, it is important to provide familiar interaction
techniques to the experts, supporting them during the analy-
sis in finding newmalicious patterns and gaining new insights
from the data.
R4 Expert knowledge: Externalization of expert knowledge to
reuse and share. When analysts solve real world problems, they
have large volumes of complex and heterogeneous data at their
disposal. By externalizing and storing of the experts’ implicit
knowledge (Chen et al., 2009), it can be made system-internally
available as computerized knowledge to support further analy-
sis or other analysts.
We designed the visualization and interaction techniques
of KAMAS, focusing on the defined requirements, followed by
the algorithm design and implementation based on a user-
centered design process (Sharp et al., 2007). In this way, we
Fig. 3 – Behavior-based malware analysis process as
conducted by our collaborators.
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addressed the third and fourth level of Munzner’s nested model
(Munzner, 2009). During these steps, we collaborated with a
group of three IT-security experts to get formative feedback for
the design and implementation process of KAMAS.Two of them
were malware analysts who were also involved in the previ-
ous focus group for problem characterization and abstraction
(Wagner et al., 2014). All domain experts had more than 5 years
experience in behavior-based malware analysis and experi-
ence with several tools. For summative evaluation of usability
(Cooper et al., 2007), user studies were performed with pre-
defined datasets provided by our IT-security collaborators.
3. Related work
In general, problem-oriented research is rather underrepre-
sented in literature (Lam et al., 2012; McKenna et al., 2015, 2016;
Pirker and Nusser, 2016; Sedlmair et al., 2012). One example
is RelEx (Sedlmair et al., 2012), a design study with automo-
tive engineers to optimize in-car communication networks.
Other than that, Pretorius and Van Wijk (2009) point out that
it is important for visualization designers to ask themselves:
“What does the user want to see?” and “What do the data want
to be?” as well as how these two points mutually enhance one
another. In the problem domain of cyber security, Fink et al.
(2009) developed a set of visualization design principles with
a focus on high-resolution displays and presented proto-
types according to these design principles. Goodall et al. (2004)
conducted contextual interviews to gain a better understand-
ing of the intrusion detection workflow and proposed a three-
phased model in which tasks could be decoupled by necessary
know-how to provide more flexibility for organizations in train-
ing new analysts. However, none of these user-centered studies
tackled behavior-based malware pattern analysis.
Previous research explored the area of malware analysis from
different points of view. Conti (2007) dedicated a part of his book
to visualization for malware detection but focused on the
network level. Lee et al. (2011) proposed a context-specific
variant of scatter plots to classify malware by properties ex-
tracted using a signature-based approach. Dornhackl et al. (2014)
introduced a workflow for malware pattern extraction. They
log the system calls of malicious software which is executed
on a host and analyze them. In this way, it is possible to extract
and definemalicious system call patterns. In 2015,Wagner et al.
(2015) presented a survey on visualization systems for malware
analysis. They described 25 malware visualization tools and
categorized their main analysis focus based on the “Malware
Visualization Taxonomy”. This taxonomy described the two
main areas of malware visualization systems. On the one hand,
there are systems for “Individual Malware Analysis” which
support the analysis of a single malware sample to gain new
insights (e.g., Donahue et al., 2013; Wüchner et al., 2014). On
the other hand, there are systems for “Malware Classifica-
tion”which support the comparison ofmany samples to identify
the common behavior (e.g., Gove et al., 2014; Han et al., 2014;
Long et al., 2014). For example, Wüchner et al. (2014) pro-
posed the interactive “DAVAST” system for the detection and
analysis of email worm attacks. Additionally, Gove et al. (2014)
introduced “SEEM”, which allows the behavioral comparison
of a large set of malware samples in relation to the imported
DLLs and callback domains.
However, none of these approaches covered the full set of
requirements as specified by Wagner et al. (2014) during their
problem characterization and abstraction. Our paper is based
on this prior research, with the goal of developing an analy-
sis interface which reflects the analysts’ workflow. In particular,
we integrated a set of well-known visualization techniques for
the IT-security community and integrated a KDB structured by
the “malicious behavior scheme” (Dornhackl et al., 2014).Thus,
KAMAS will contribute to the emerging topic of knowledge-
assisted visualization (Chen et al., 2009). Some problem-
oriented projects (e.g., Mistelbauer et al., 2012) and general
frameworks (e.g., Tominski, 2011) integrate explicit knowl-
edge in visualization but not in a form similar to malware
behavior patterns.
4. Design and implementation
This work is based on our prior work (Wagner et al., 2014) to
characterize and abstract the domain problem of behavior-
based malware analysis. Therefore, we set up a design study
project to find a visualization solution that followed a user-
centered design process (Sharp et al., 2007).We involved a group
of three domain experts in malware analysis and IT-security
to keep the design in line with the analyzed needs of our prior
work.We iteratively produced sketches, screen prototypes, and
functional prototypes (Kulyk et al., 2007). Based on these, we
gathered feedback about the design’s usability and how well
it supports their analysis needs. The design study resulted in
the KAMAS prototype (see Fig. 4), which is implemented in Java.
Next, we elaborate on central design decisions.
Visualization concept:When loading an input file, all of the
included system and API calls are presented in the “Call Ex-
plorer” area (see Fig. 4.3).
Call explorer: The call table (see Fig. 4.3.a) contains three
columns. From left to right, it provides at first detailed in-
formation on the call occurrence, which shows the
appearance in the loaded file, thus helping the analyst to iden-
tify interesting calls depending on their occurrence frequency
(e.g., if the cluster was generated with 16 samples, calls that
occur 16 times or a multiple of 16 times are more interest-
ing than others).The occurrence frequencies are quantitative
data presented as bar charts, which serve as a quick visual
decision support, and numbers for a precise comparison
(graphical tables). The second column visualizes the name
of the calls as a string which is a nominal value and the third
column displays the unique ID of the call as an ordinal value.
Rule explorer:The included rules of the loaded input file are
visualized in the “Rule Exploration” area (see Fig. 4.2) found
in the rule overview table (see Fig. 4.2.a). From left to right,
“Occurrence” tells the analyst how often the visualized rule
occurs in the loaded file visualized by bar charts and
numbers. These values are related to the occurrence his-
togram by color (see Fig. 4.2.g) in the “Rule Filter” area, which
serves as an overview of the rule distribution depending on
their occurrence. The second column “ ==”, provides infor-
mation as to whether the rule is equally distributed in all
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the traces of the loaded cluster. More precisely, if the rep-
resented rule occurs equally often in all traces combined
in the cluster-grammar the related column will be colored
orange, otherwise it is colored gray. In the third column
(“Calls in Rule”) the graphical summary (see Fig. 5) visual-
izes the included calls.
Graphical summary in the rule explorer: Due to the fact that
a rule consists of 1 to n calls, it is difficult for the analysts
to read them completely, to remember them in their correct
order and to compare themwith other rules.To simplify the
unfavorable textual representation and to make the struc-
tures of the rulesmore comparable,we developed a graphical
summary for the representation of the contained calls. In
the graphical summary, each pixel is related to a specific
system call ID and has a fixed position to allow their com-
parison. Each call ID related pixel signifies whether a call
of a certain type is present in the rule (colored black) or not.
Thus, fingerprints of rules that have many calls in common
look visually similar. If a rule’s call occurs more often, only
one line is displayed for it. For example, if a rule contains
four calls (length of four) and less than four lines are dis-
played in the graphical summary (e.g., three or two), one
or more calls occur more often than once. Based on the
graphical summary, the analyst has the opportunity to
compare the included rules and to recognize similar rules
faster in relation to the included calls. Furthermore, the
graphical summary is based on the Gestalt principle of simi-
larity (Johnson, 2014) in order to support the analyst in
quickly recognizing related call combinations.That is to say,
rules that contain similar sets of calls have similar line pat-
terns. This allows analysts to quickly assess similarity
without the need to consider exactly which calls are part
of the involved rules. Additionally, a tool tip is provided for
a quick look at the included calls in the rule. The three dif-
ferent color intensities from dark to light red of the graphical
summary informs the analyst whether a rule in the KDB
is “fully known” (already stored), “partially known” (par-
tially stored) or “not known” (unknown) whereas these rules
are defined by the analyst or other users. A “fully known”
rule which is highlighted dark red, is included as-is in the
KDB. A “partially known” rule (middle red) describes a rule
which contains at least one more call at the beginning or
at the end of a “fully known” rule, and is not stored in this
form in the KDB. The highlighting of the rules is per-
formed internally by comparison of the rules contained in
the input file and the rules stored in the KDB. In the last
Fig. 4 – User interface of the KAMAS prototype with its three main areas. 1) The (1.a) tree structure of the knowledge
database (KDB) and the (1.b) test menu used for logging during the user study. 2) The rule explorer including the (2.a) rule
overview table and the graphical summaries, the (2.b) connection line to the (2.c) rule detail table representing the included
calls and the (2.d) arc-diagram for pattern recognition support. Additionally, on the bottom there are different filtering
options (2.e–h). 3) The call explorer interface including (3.a) the table of calls available in the loaded file and different
filtering options (3.b–d).
Fig. 5 – Detail of the graphical summary in the rule
overview table. This is a space-efficient rule representation
with lines marking distinct calls contained in the rule,
regardless of the occurrence order and number.
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column, the analyst receives information about the length
of the visualized rule (number of included calls). If the
analyst compares the number of lines from the graphical
summary with the related rule length, the analyst can rec-
ognize quickly whether it matches or not as described above.
Like the occurrence column, this column is also related to
a histogram (see Fig. 4.2.h) in the filter area showing the dis-
tribution of the lengths of the rules.
Rule detail table in the rule explorer: Additionally, in the “Rule
Exploration” area, the rule detail table (see Fig. 4.2.c) visu-
alizes the included calls and the unique ID of a selected rule
in its actual execution order.To support the analysts during
their work on pattern search,we included a real time pattern
search. For the visualization of patterns which are in-
cluded in the represented execution order, arc-diagrams
(Wattenberg, 2002) are used (see Fig. 4.2.d). In this way, the
analyst receives a visual representation of recurrence pat-
terns up to the five largest patterns in a rule.
Connection line in the rule explorer: To connect the rule over-
view table and the rule detail table, we integrated a table
connection line (see Fig. 4.2.b). This line connects a se-
lected rule from the overview table to the detailed execution
order of the integrated calls in the detail table. Thus, the
user is informed of where the selected rule is located during
scrolling in the view. By a click on the connection line, the
selected rule comes back into focus.
Visual interface design concept: IT-security experts are well
skilled programmers and programming IDEs usually have a
similar structure and workflow. Based on the findings of our
prior research described in Section 2, we decided to imbue the
design of KAMAS with programming IDE interfaces such as
Eclipse or NetBeans. Based on this interface structure we could
establish a familiar workflow concept on multiple views for the
IT-security experts. In relation to these well-known interface
structures, we situated the tree structure of the KDB (see Fig. 4.1)
to the left side of the interface like the project structure. Ad-
ditionally, we positioned the “Rule Explorer” in the center of
the screen (see Fig. 4.2) like the development area. This is the
most used element of the prototype – the main screen, used
to explore and analyze the calls which are included in a rule.
Moreover, we positioned the “Call Exploration” area to the right
of the interface (see Fig. 4.3), like the functions overview area
in commonly used programming IDEs. In this area, the user
has the ability to explore all of the calls which are included
in the rules in the middle and to obtain detailed information
about them. In addition to the design decision in relation to
a programming IDE, we used Gestalt principles (Johnson, 2014)
to improve interface clarity. Each exploration area (Rule Ex-
plorer and Call Explorer) contains its own filtering area below
the data visualization (based on the Gestalt principles of prox-
imity and similarity).
Interaction concept: For a better understanding of its func-
tionality, we describe KAMAS according to five steps based on
the visual information seeking mantra by Shneiderman (1992):
overview first, rearrange and filter, details-on-demand, then
extract and analyze further.
Overview:When the malware analyst loads an input file, the
tables for rule overview (see Fig. 4.2.a) and call explora-
tion (see Fig. 4.3.a) are filled with the complete data of all
extracted rules and all calls occurring in these rules. Fur-
thermore, the histograms (see Fig. 4.2.g and Fig. 4.2.h) give
an impression of the distribution in rule occurrence and
length of the currently loaded cluster grammar file.
Rearrange: The analyst can now rearrange both the display
of rules and calls by sorting the tables by any column.
Filter:The next step is to reduce the number of rules under
consideration. For this purpose, the interface offers a se-
lection of several filtering options. The analyst can start by
filtering the calls (see Fig. 4.3.b–c) or selecting calls di-
rectly from the call exploration table. Furthermore, the
analyst can filter rules by their number of occurrence, by
their length, whether their occurrence is equally distrib-
uted across samples, and whether they match or partially
match rules from the KDB (see Fig. 4.2.e–h). The rules dis-
played in the center table are updated immediately, where
the graphical summary gives an impression of the in-
cluded calls.
Details-on-demand: If a rule catches the analyst’s interest,
it can be selected from the rule overview table. This action
opens the rule in the rule detail table (see Fig. 4.2.c), where
the analyst can read the included calls in their sequential
order. The arc-diagram provides information about re-
peated subsequences within a rule (see Fig. 4.2.d). All the
contained subsequences are analyzed in real time. In order
to not confuse the analyst, only the five largest subse-
quences are presented in the visualization.
Extract: Once the analyst has found a possibly malicious rule,
it can be added to the KDB by dragging it from the rule over-
view table into the tree structure of the KDB (see Fig. 4.1.a).
Alternatively, the analyst can select some calls of a rule in
the rule detail table and add them to the KDB by drag and
drop. This updates the background color of the rule over-
view table,which allows further analysis under consideration
of the added rule.
Input data: In general, the input data are sequences of
system and API calls which are logged during the execution
of malware samples in protected laboratory environments
(Wagner et al., 2015) as described in Section 2. In some pre-
processing steps, the data of several analyzed malware samples
(e.g., from the same malware family) are clustered and trans-
formed into a context-free grammar in order to reduce the
immense number of calls, simplify the analysis and reduce
storage costs. The outcome of these preprocessing steps is
loaded into KAMAS.
In our specific case, the following preprocessing steps are
adopted from our collaborators’ malware analysis process (see
Fig. 3): First, the sample under scrutiny is executed inside iso-
lated, partially virtualized laboratory environment using a
number of different tools (e.g., APImon (API Monitor, 2016),
Procmon (Microsoft, 2016)). By monitoring all activities, these
systems generate a report (i.e. trace) of system and API calls
sequentially invoked by the sample. In the second step, the
traces are clustered withMalheur, an automated behavior analy-
sis and classification tool developed by Rieck et al. (Rieck, 2016).
In the third step, all traces within a cluster are concatenated
and processed using the Sequitur algorithm (Nevill-Manning
and Witten, 1997). In relation to this step, the system and API
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call parameter are neglected (e.g., memory addresses, user
names) which simplify the creation of a context-free grammar
of the combined samples in the cluster and generates a bird’s-
eye view. If some parameters are needed, they can be considered
by attaching them behind the call using a separator (e.g.,
CreateProcess#winword.exe). It is important to note that the
alphabet of the context-free grammar will increase by con-
sidering the call parameters. Originally developed for file
compression, Sequitur automatically replaces frequent pat-
terns with short symbols, effectively generating a context-
free grammar in the process, which is referred to as
cluster-grammar and forms the input data format for the
KAMAS prototype. The data structure of the cluster-grammar
is a simple directed acyclic graph. Leafs are called “termi-
nals” and represent distinct system calls. Other nodes are called
“non-terminals” and are represented by numbers. Addition-
ally, a sequence of system calls (terminals) composed from the
cluster-grammar is called “rule” and represents a part of the
sample’s actual execution order.
While our collaborators only analyzed malware samples on
Windows operating systems, it will also be possible to analyze
malware for other operating systems based on data provid-
ers for these operating systems. After the transformation into
the input data structure as described above, they can be loaded
into KAMAS.
Internal data handling concept: To increase the perfor-
mance of our prototype, we decided to use a data-oriented
design (Fabian, 2013) (e.g., used in game development and real
time rendering) to organize and perform transformations on
the loaded data. For example, we implemented map and set
data structures as translation tables and for the input data, we
mapped the strings to integers. Based on this mapping, we built
an internal data structure to increase performance and to de-
crease memory usage. In combination with these structures,
we implemented an action pipeline (similar to a render pipe-
line) in which it is possible to link filter options in order to
realize high performance dynamic query environments and to
perform all operations on the data in real time.
To test the robustness and performance of KAMAS, we
loaded and worked with several different cluster-grammar files
containing between ten and 42 traces of malware samples in
the cluster-grammar at sizes between 61 and 7278 rules. The
included malware samples were collected by our collabora-
tors from the IT-security department in 2014 to test their
behavior-based malware analysis and clustering system. Some
analysis examples and KAMAS prototypes are available on:
http://phaidra.fhstp.ac.at/o:1264. Overall, they collected a sample
set with 800 different malware samples of different families
(worms, trojanhorses and bots). Additionally, with these
datasets, the system handles more than 8000 different windows
system and API calls.
Filter possibilities: The implemented filtering options are
organized in two separated filter action pipelines where the
input data depends on the loaded analysis file. The first pipe-
line connects all filters for the call exploration area by using
an “and” operator. The result of the first filter pipeline affects
the call exploration (see Fig. 4.3) and the rule exploration (see
Fig. 4.2) area. The output of the call exploration action pipe-
line is the basic input of the rule exploration action pipeline.
In this pipeline, all included filters work similar to the call ex-
ploration action pipeline and control only the rule exploration
area of the interface (see Fig. 6).The integration of action pipe-
lines for data filtering has the benefit of being easy to change,
and quickly include or exclude new or not needed filtering
options into KAMAS.
Call filters: Below the call table, three filter options are ar-
ranged. All these filters determine the contents of the call
table and subsequently the rule exploration. The “Occur-
rence” filter (see Fig. 4.3.b) is implemented as range slider
to select the region of interest. Below is the “Call (Regex)”
filter (see Fig. 4.3.c) with a separate option for “Case Sen-
sitive” search. This filter allows the entry of a regular
expression or plain strings which are internally converted
into a regular expression for a sub-string search. The third
filter option operates on the unique ‘ID’s (see Fig. 4.3.d) of
the calls. If the user selects one or more calls in the call table
(see Fig. 4.3.a), a fourth filter level will be established. All
of these filters are connected in a dynamic query system
(see Fig. 6.2).
Rule filters: From left to right, we included the following fil-
tering options according to the suggestions of the
collaborating domain experts: The “multiples only” option
provides the opportunity to show only rules that occur with
a multiple number of times of the included samples in the
loaded cluster (e.g., 16 samples included → only rules that
occur 16, 32, … times will be shown).The option “equal only”
eliminates all rules which are not equally distributed in the
included samples (see Fig. 4.2.e). Below the knowledge da-
tabase filter options are arranged (see Fig. 4.2.f) to activate
or deactivate the visualization of rules based on their knowl-
edge state. Additionally, the rule exploration filtering unit
includes two range sliders (Ahlberg and Shneiderman, 1994)
combined with histograms (see Fig. 4.2.g–h) for the visual-
ization of the data distribution and for the selection of a
region of interest. Fig. 4.2.g serves the filtering option based
on the “Occurrence” of the rules and the related histo-
gram shows the distribution of the rules in relation to the
Fig. 6 – Data flow diagram of the KAMAS prototype
including the two filter action pipelines. 1) The KDB which
affect the rule table depending on the stored knowledge. 2)
The rule table representing the included rules of the loaded
input data. Its filter pipeline gets affected by the output of
the KDB and the call table filters. 3) The call table visualizes
the included calls. Its filtering pipeline affects the call
visualization and biased the rule table filter pipeline.
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loaded file. The user can also select a region of interest de-
pending on the “Length” (see Fig. 4.2.h) by range slider
interaction, similar to the “Occurrence” workflow.
Externalized knowledge integration:To support the malware
analysts during their work, we integrated a KDB related to the
malware behavior schema by Dornhackl et al. (2014)., which
is included on the left side of the interface (see Fig. 4.1) as an
indented list (tree structure). At the end of each folder de-
scription, the number of contained rules in the integrated
subfolders is shown.To add new rules to the KDB, the system
provides two possibilities: On the one hand, the user can add
a full rule by drag and drop from the rule overview table (see
Fig. 4.2.a), and on the other hand, the user has the ability to
select a set of calls from the rule detail table (see Fig. 4.2.c) and
add them by drag and drop to the KDB. When adding a new
rule, the tree automatically unfolds the hovered folder. All of
the rules which are integrated in the KDB will be checked
against the loaded input data automatically. In this way, the
system distinguishes between three types of rules (see Fig. 4.2.a
and 4.2.f): not known (light red), partially known (middle red)
and fully known rules (dark red). Additionally, the KAMAS pro-
totype provides the ability to activate or deactivate (parts of)
the KDB or to select the types of rules which should be shown
in the rule overview table.
Knowledge generation loop: Fig. 7 provides an overview of the
system’s knowledge generation loop, starting at the dark
gray inner loop. In general, the system’s KDB stores all
known rules, which were generated by former cluster file
analysis sessions. If the analyst loads a new cluster file, the
included rules will be checked automatically against the ac-
tivated KDB parts (see Fig. 7.1). Depending on the prior
automated analysis, the system provides a visual repre-
sentation of loaded rules in relation to its knowledge state
(see Fig. 7.2). Henceforth, the analyst can carry out the data
exploration and analysis (the analyst is part of the knowl-
edge generation loop). During the cluster analysis, the analyst
has the ability to extend the KDB with new rules (see Fig. 7.3)
found during the data exploration process. By adding new
rules to the KDB, the system automatically refreshes the
rules highlighting depending on the new knowledge state
(see Fig. 7.4), which brings us into the outer (light gray) loop.
Here the analyst is part of the continuously recurring loop
(see Fig. 7.5) (for data exploration see Fig. 7.6 and for knowl-
edge generation see Fig. 7.7).
5. Functional overview of KAMAS
If an analysts loads new malware data, KAMAS provides a
general overview of all included system and API calls and all
preprocessed rules which are sequences of calls (see Fig. 4).
Furthermore, in the “Rule Explorer” (see Fig. 4.2.a) the analyst
can see a graphical summary with different background colors
depending on the knowledge state of the KDB. If a rule is fully
known in the KDB, the rule’s background is dark red, a light
red background tells the analyst that a KDB rule is included
in the represented rule but surrounded by at least one other
call. The light red background tells the analyst that this rule
did not match with the KDB, which may mean that it is not
hostile or was not yet recognized. Based on the different fil-
tering options provided, the analyst has the possibility to search
for rules of interest iteratively.
Rule selection and investigation: If the analyst selects a rule
in the “Rule Explorer”, the selected rule becomes highlighted
(see Fig. 4.2.a). At the same time, on the right side, a detail table
is generated which represents the individual calls in chrono-
logical sequential order (see Fig. 4.2.c). Additionally, a vertical
arc-diagram (see Fig. 4.2.d) represents sub-sequence repeti-
tions found, which supports the analyst in finding the smallest
sequence without sub-patterns.
Searching for specific calls: If the analyst searches for a spe-
cific call, the call’s name can be entered into the name filter
in the “Call Filter” area (see Fig. 4.3.c). Here, the analyst has
the ability to enter regular expressions for the search. Thus,
it is also possible to add only a part of the call’s name to search
for a specific group. Additionally, it is also possible to select
one or more calls of interest in the “Call Exploration” area (see
Fig. 4.3.a). All of these abilities affect the “Rule Exploration” area
so that each represented rule has to contain at least one of the
selected (filtered) calls.
Storing new patterns: If the analyst wants to store a new
rule in the KDB, the system provides two options. The first
option is that the analyst selects the full rule in the overview
table and adds this rule by drag and drop into the KDB (see
Fig. 4.1.a). The second option relates to the detail table. The
analyst selects only the calls of interest of a found rule and
adds them as a new rule by drag and drop to the KDB. Nomatter
which option the analyst selects, the tree structure in the KDB
automatically unfolds the hovered categories so that the
analyst can add the selection in the right category or sub
category.
Fig. 7 – Overview of the system’s knowledge generation
loop, beginning with the dark gray inner loop after loading
a new file and changing to the light gray outer loop for
interactive data exploration and knowledge generation
cycle. The analyst is a major part in both loops.
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6. Validation methods and results
To validate the KAMAS prototype and provide evidence for its
effectiveness, we followed a threefold research approach con-
sisting of moderated expert reviews, user studies and focus
groupmeetings (Lazar et al., 2010).All of the insights were docu-
mented in detail to ensure reproducibility (Smuc et al., 2015)
and used to improve our research prototype.All materials used,
such as interview guidelines and tasks, are available on our
supplement material homepage: http://phaidra.fhstp.ac.at/
o:1264.
6.1. Expert review
In the first step, we conducted moderated expert reviews to
eliminate usability issues in the basic functionality and ap-
pearance of the interface.
Participants: To validate the visual interface design, we
invited three usability experts for this step (see Table 1). Each
of them has between two and 20 years of experience in this
field. Two of them are between 20 and 29 years of age, have a
Master’s degree and advanced knowledge in usability. One of
them is between 40 and 49 years old, has a PhD degree and
expert knowledge in usability engineering from industry and
research projects.
Design and procedure: Each usability expert received a short
introduction to the basic features and the workflow of the
system. Next, each expert was walked through each feature
individually and was asked to critique potential usability
issues.
Apparatus and materials: As evaluation material, we gen-
erated a fully functional build of KAMAS and used the same
version for each expert review. The review sessions were per-
formed on a 15″ notebook with a full HD screen resolution and
an external mouse for navigation. Each expert review was docu-
mented on paper by the facilitator.
Results:The basic color scheme of the prototype was found
to be easily recognizable. Only the coloring of the “multiples
only” option was pointed out as being not well differentiated
from the other elements (see Fig. 4). Basically, the dynamic query
features (Ahlberg et al., 1992) were described as being very
useful. If the user left the focus of a filtering input box, the in-
terface had to automatically apply the entered parameter.
Additionally, in the filtering option “call”, the experts sug-
gested that it would be helpful to update the search results
after each input. Overall, all of the usability experts provided
positive feedback on the design structure of the prototype. All
of the expert’s suggestions were included for a redesign and
revision of the prototype in order to prevent the users from
having basic interface issues.
6.2. User study
A user study with six IT-security experts was performed in
October 2015. It lasted one hour on average and encom-
passed five analysis tasks, the system usability scale
questionnaire (SUS) (Brooke, 1996), and a semi-structured in-
terview.The goals (G) and non-goals (NG) of the user study were
defined as:
G1: Testing the functionality of the research prototype.
G2: Testing the visualization techniques for comprehensi-
bility in relation to the domain.
G3: Testing the utility of knowledge storage and represen-
tation in the system.
NG1: Comparison of the research prototype with another
analysis system.
NG2: Conducting performance tests.
Participants:We invited six IT-security experts (see Table 2)
to participate in the user study. Two participants were also
members of the focus group for the user-centered design
process and gave feedback on sketches and early prototypes
(see Section 4). All subjects are working in the field of behavior-
based malware detection and analysis or in a closely related
field of IT-security. All of them are involved in malware analy-
sis projects in cooperation with different industries partners.
Design and procedure: At the beginning of the user study,
each participant was asked about a general impression of the
user interface and which functions could be recognized. This
step took approximately five minutes. Subsequently, each par-
ticipant had to solve five guided analysis tasks. The first three
included a step-wise introduction to the system and the last
two were combined analysis tasks to determine the under-
standing of the prototype’s workflow (this step was also required
for the subsequent SUS questionnaire). Each analysis task was
read to the participant at the beginning of the task, and for
reference, each task handed over to the participant in printed
form. For the analysis tasks, participants spent approxi-
mately 30 minutes.
After the analysis task session, each participant had to fill
out a SUS questionnaire in less than five minutes. The SUS is
a standardized, technology-independent questionnaire to evalu-
ate the usability of a system (Brooke, 1996). During this test,
the participants were asked ten questions on a five-level Likert
scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Table 1 – Overview of usability experts who participated
in the expert reviews of the KAMAS prototype.
(Knowledge: 1: = basic, 2: = skilled, 3: = advanced,
4: = expert).
Person Age Knowledge Gender Education
E1 40–49 4 m PhD
E2 20–29 3 f MSc
E3 20–29 3 m MSc
Table 2 – Data of the user study participants.
(R: = research group, F: = faculty; knowledge: 1: = basic,
2: = skilled, 3: = advanced, 4: = expert).
Person Organization Age Knowledge Education
P1 R 30–39 4 PhD
P2 R 30–39 4 MSc
P3 R 30–39 4 MSc
P4 R 30–39 4 PhD
P5 R 30–39 3 MSc
P6 F 60–69 4 PhD
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Finally, we performed semi-structured interview sessions
with an average duration of 20 minutes. For this, we used an
interview guideline consisting of ten major questions address-
ing general system usability, filtering, using the KDB, and
individual visual metaphors used in KAMAS.
Apparatus and materials:We used a silent and clean room
without any distractions to perform the three parts of the user
study for all participants under the same conditions.
The five analysis tasks were performed on a 15″ notebook
with full HD screen resolution and an external mouse. As
dataset for the analysis tasks, we used a set of 16 malware
samples (from the same family) executed and logged on a
Windows operating system and transformed into KAMAS’ input
data format containing 794 rules as described in Section 4. To
achieve the best outcome, we asked the participants to apply
thinking aloud (Nielsen, 1993).We recorded the screen and the
participant using the notebook’s internal webcam. In paral-
lel, the prototype logged user interactions using EvalBench
(Aigner et al., 2013) (see Fig. 4.1.b) and the facilitator took notes
in our pre-defined test guideline.
The SUS questionnaire and semi-structured interview were
conducted on paper in the participants’ native language. For
the detailed questions, we used small images in the inter-
view guidelines to support the participants in recalling the
respective parts of the prototype. All test tasks used and in-
terview guidelines are available on our supplement material
homepage: http://phaidra.fhstp.ac.at/o:1264.
Results: The following part describes the major findings of
each part of the test and summarizes their results.
Analysis tasks: During the five analysis tasks, all partici-
pants described their solutions to the tasks at hand by thinking
aloud. They expressed problems as well as benefits of the
systems during their work. A major problem pointed out by
most participants was that in many cases they had to read tool
tips about different filter options but the text disappeared too
quickly [P1, P2, P3, P5]. Additionally, all participants told us that
they had problems understanding the arc-diagrams. Only P3
stated: “It is an indication that something is included. I un-
derstood and applied it.” In contrast, all but one participant
noted that they quickly understood the handling of the knowl-
edge database and its features in the prototype [P1, P2, P3, P5,
P6].
System usability scale (SUS): By applying the SUS, we were
able to obtain a good indication concerning the handling of our
KAMAS prototype.The results show a SUS value of 75.83 points
out of 100, which can be interpreted as good without signifi-
cant usability issues according to the SUS description by Bangor
et al. (2009).They described the SUS questionnaires result from
different perspectives: From the perspective of the acceptabil-
ity range, a value between 70 and 100 points is labeled as
“acceptable and from the adjective rating perspective, the
KAMAS SUS result lies in a range between good (73 points) and
excellent (85 points). In general, all participants were able to
recognize the interaction design and interface changes in re-
lation to the work steps they fulfilled. Based on the SUS
description and average evaluation of the system by the par-
ticipants, the result of the usability assessment was very
positive. Sauro (2011) compared 500 SUS scores and identi-
fied the average score as 68 points.Additionally, he showed that
only 36% of the compared tests reached an SUS score higher
than 74, and only 10% of the systems reached an SUS score
greater than 80, which shows us that our system receives a
grade of ‘B” at this implementation state.
During the test, the participants again addressed the tool
tip complication and the missing brief introduction of the in-
cluded visualization techniques. These comments were also
apparent concerning SUS question ten: “I needed to learn a lot
of things before I could get going with this system” (Brooke,
1996), with a score of 50%. In contrast, the SUS questions con-
cerning the complexity, functionality integration, consistency,
learnability and usability (number two and five to eight) clearly
reached more than 80%.Thus, focus areas for further improve-
ments were identified.
Interviews: Here, we present the results of the performed
interviews structured along ten main questions. All partici-
pant statements quoted in this section have been translated
from German to English by the authors.
Are the filter options understandable? In general, the filter
options were classified as very useful by all participants (P1–
P6), e.g., as P6 stated, “Yes, nothing more to say about it.” P4
and P5 also added that all filters were well labeled so that it
was possible to recognize their mode of action immediately.
In the call filter by name part, it was confirmed by the par-
ticipants that the regular expression support was a great
advantage. Additionally, P1 was very glad that the system au-
tomatically performs a full text search if there are no regular
expression elements added. P1 and P3 added that the range
sliders were very helpful and reflected the selected area very
well. Likewise, it was mentioned that the arrangement is
intuitive.
Were the different visualization techniques helpful? P1 and P3–
P6 indicated that the various visual elements contributed
significantly to understanding the system. P1 and P6 stated that
the graphical summary (see Fig. 5) was very useful, although
participant P6 added that a brief description would have been
helpful. P3 mentioned that the interesting rules were imme-
diately found by adhering to the graphical representations (e.g.,
coloring, bars in the table columns, arc-diagrams for pattern
recognition) and they provided a good overview of how often
they occur. P1 and P3–P6 noted that the colored background
of the individual categories and elements aided significantly
in finding relationships and helped in understanding the
system. P1 and P6 indicated that the arc-diagramwas not really
understandable, and only P3 immediately recognized that it
is used to visualize recurring patterns in the data. P3 added
that the histograms were very helpful to see the loaded file’s
data distribution.
Did you understand the use of the knowledge database? The
handling and the meaning of the KDB was assessed as very
useful by all subjects (P1 – P6). However, P5 indicated that a
short description of the functional advantage would have
been helpful in understanding it more quickly. Likewise, it
was described as very easy to insert new rules in the data-
base. The tree structure was very well received by the
participants. P3 stated that drag and drop worked very well
for the insertion of new rules. Interestingly, P2 stated that
“The knowledge database can also be interpreted as a kind
of pre-filter for data use”.This relates to the automated analy-
sis by using the KDB to highlight the knowledge state of
included rules in the loaded input file. Thereby, the analyst
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gets the ability to include or exclude these rules depending
on the explicit knowledge.
Were the different ways of knowledge representation helpful in
finding the right choices? In general, all participants (P1 – P6) stated
that the KDB is ([P4] “probably”) helpful for decision making.
P1 and P5 described it as well suited for checking the rules in
the loaded file. That answers frequently asked analysis tasks
such as: “Is the sample doing what the database says?” [P1];
“What is the type of the considered sample?” [P1, P5]. P3 and
P5 mentioned that the database would also be used as a search
option to instantly find or investigate rules with predefined
content. In this regard, P5 added that the KDB was very helpful
for quickly searching and filtering. “If the Knowledge
database is filled, it makes sense to focus on this” [P1]. P2 in-
dicated that it depends on the task.
How was the expert knowledge represented in the system? P1,
P3 and P4 related to the KDB and their tree structure repre-
senting the explicit knowledge stored in the system.
Additionally, P2, P5 and P6 referred to the color gradation in
the graphical summary representing the knowledge state of
a rule in the KDB. It was very well understood by the partici-
pants, that the KDB could be filled by other experts or by
themselves. Thus they had the chance to explore existing ex-
ternalized knowledge, learn from it and add their own. “Any
expert has added this into the database marked as impor-
tant or prominent”, stated P3. P2, P5 and P6 referred to the red
three-step color map which is used for the background in the
graphical summary. In this way, the user recognizes immedi-
ately if a rule matches with the database (not known, partially
known, or fully known).The red three-step color map was un-
derstood by all participants and described as clear and logical.
P1 added, “If a malware changes over time, it can be found by
means of expert knowledge”.
Were the bar charts included in the table cells helpful? The bar
charts in the table cells (see Fig. 5) were generally described
as very helpful and useful, because one immediately gets an
overview of the distribution and thus can estimate the fre-
quencies at a glance. Additionally, P1, P2, and P3 added that
the sorting of the data can be recognized immediately, thus
min and max values could be found very quickly. P1 – P3, P5 –
P6 mentioned that the bar charts were very easy to read, helped
recognizing frequencies, and in comparing the occurrence,
length, and distribution. P4 and P5 added that this presenta-
tion is much better for comparison than numerical
representations because they can be estimated. In case it is
necessary to get the exact value of a cell entry, all partici-
pants stated that they would use the exact number.
Were the histograms displaying rules helpful? P1, P3, P4, and P6
stated that the histogram information on the distribution of
the length and occurrence of the rules in relation to the loaded
file was important additional information. P1 additionally men-
tioned that it would be helpful to gray-out the areas of the
histogram which are not selected in relation to the underly-
ing range slider. “A solution by means of shading would also
be feasible and would require less space”, stated P4. P5 indi-
cated that such a representation is not applied in other known
tools.
Was the connection between the two tables helpful? The con-
necting line was described by all participants as very or
absolutely useful. P3 and P6 called the connection optically very
supportive because it helped the eyes’ transition to the second
table. Additionally, P1 and P6 valuated the connection line as
helpful for scrolling because you can always find the associ-
ated rule again. “After recently trying it out, the connection line
was very helpful”, stated P5.
Were the arc-diagrams next to the detail table helpful? The
arc-diagram provoked mixed opinions among the partici-
pants. All of the participants stated that interesting elements
in the resolved rule were made visible by the arcs. However,
the precise usage and meaning, was recognized only by P3.
“This is a part of a pattern in a rule which is again discover-
able on the first glance. This might be confusing, but at least
you always see if patterns are contained”, stated P3. In
general, four out of six participants (P1, P2, P4, and P5)
considered this visualization method to be confusing and
would likely reject it. They demanded a different form of
presentation for pattern highlighting. Other critical com-
ments were: “The overlap of same colors does not make
sense” [P4]. “With a description certainly useful” stated P2
and P5. “I did not understand it without [visualization] back-
ground knowledge” [P5].
What is your overall impression of the software? In general, all
participants (P1 – P6) described the prototype as very clear after
having a brief explanation. The overall layout was described
as clear, and the graphical summary was also found to be very
helpful. “Simple and very good. Definitely useful for the ap-
plication” stated P6. Likewise, it was stressed that the prototype
includes many functions but it is not overloaded. P2 com-
mented the system is useful for exploratory tasks in malware
analysis. P5 added that a long-term test would be interest-
ing. Participant P4 suggested changing the arrangement of the
KDB and the call exploration (see Fig. 4) in a way that a work-
flow results from left to right.
Combined results: Based on the combined insights from the
five analysis tasks, the SUS and the interviews, we compiled
and rated a list of found issues inspired by Nielsen’s severity
ratings (Nielsen, 1993).This list includes “feature requests” (FR)
and “severities” (SE) (see Table 3). All of these adjustments were
included before the following focus group meetings.
Table 3 – List of identified feature requests and
severities (FR: 1: = nice to have, 2: = good feature,
3: = enhances usability; SE: 1: = minor, 2: = big,
3: = disaster; Effort: 1: = min, 2: = average, 3: = max).
Description FR SE Effort
KDB: Include number of underlying
elements
2 - 3
KDB: Gray out inactive elements 2 - 2
KDB: Automatically unfold by hover 3 - 3
Filter: Adding the number of elements in
relation to the knowledge state
2 - 1
Filter: Consistency of interface labels - 2 1
Connection line: Selected rule has to
come back into focus by click
2 - 2
Arc-diagram: Reduce number of arcs - 2 1
Tables: Change “Rule” to “Calls in Rule” - 2 1
Tables: Change “=” to “ = =” (for equal
distribution)
- 2 1
…
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6.3. Industry focus group
After themost important adjustments (see Table 3) were carried
out in the prototype, we conducted two focus group meet-
ings to get feedback on the changes and gather additional
suggestions for improvement. Members of two different pro-
fessional companies in the IT-security domain participated in
these sessions. Each focus group contained three IT-security
experts from industry.
Design and procedure: The focus group meetings were de-
signed as guided meetings – we showed the prototype to the
group and explained the work steps for analysis tasks. Each
group member was asked to express feedback and provide sug-
gestions at any time.
Apparatus and material: As material, we used a fully func-
tional build of the KAMAS prototype including all improvements
based on prior evaluation results.The guided focus groupmeet-
ings were performed on a 15″ notebook with HD screen
resolution and an external mouse. Both focus group meet-
ings were held in early November 2015, with a duration of
approximately one hour and documented on paper by the ex-
periment facilitator.
Results: All focus group members reported that the proto-
type is well designed and very interesting to use because it gives
each user the ability to benefit from the expert knowledge of
others. One groupmember noted that it is hard to build amental
connection between the histogram and the related table columns.
He recommended changing the histogram’s background to the
color of the related bars in the columns. One of themajor inputs
of the industry focus groups was that not only malignant rules,
but also benign rules are important for good analysis result. Ad-
ditionally, one company offered to carry out a long-term field
study and to expand the prototype for their requirements.
7. Reflection and conclusion
Following the design study methodology (Sedlmair et al., 2012),
reflection is the third contribution to a design study (retro-
spective analysis and lessons learned) for the improvement of
current guidelines.When we broke down the reflection on our
requirements from Section 2, the different validation steps con-
firmed that our interactive visualization prototype fulfills the
requirements of malware analysts.
R1 Data:The cluster-grammar provided by IT-security experts
is a complex data structure consisting of the derivation rules,
detailed derivation information and occurrences. Using this in-
formation as basis, we designed three analysis tables for
representing the data: 1) a call overview table, visualizing all
calls included in the cluster-grammar combined with their total
occurrence; 2) the rule overview table to represent the calls in-
cluded in a rule by a graphical summary; to provide the
comparability of rules in combination with the total occur-
rence of the rule, its length and derivation information; 3) a
rule detail table, showing the included calls of a rule in their
sequential order. To gain better insights into the rules distri-
bution in relation to their occurrence and length, KAMAS
provides two different histograms, each combined with a range
slider which can be used as filtering option.
R2 Visual representation: In general, the decision for an in-
terface similar to programming IDEs was well received by the
participants. It was easy for them to understand the han-
dling and to work with it. Additionally, the participants and
the focus group members appreciated the prototype’s wide
range of coordinated features, which they regarded as useful
for data exploration while not being overloaded. A particu-
larly interesting outcome of the tests from a visualization design
perspective is that the arc-diagrams did not provide the ben-
efits we expected (e.g., easily locate and compare patterns in
the call sequences). One participant realized that something
interesting was in the data, but he could not pinpoint the
meaning.Yet, the simple connection line between the rule over-
view table and the rule detail table, which originally was
considered “nice to have” by designers, turned out to be a much
appreciated and valuable feature.Thus, the connection line sup-
ports the analysts in finding the connection between these two
representations.
R3 Workflow: All included filter methods were very well re-
ceived. Additionally, the dynamic query concept and its fast
response was understood very well by the participants. In
general, they described the relationships of the filters as in-
tuitive and the usage of the KDB by drag and drop actions as
easy to use. By subsequent focus group meetings, further im-
provements were integrated, such as the colored background
of the filters, used to emphasize visualization elements and
connections. One of the major inputs of the industry focus
group was that not only malignant rules, but also benign rules
are important for good analysis. Therefore, participants sug-
gested changing the three-step red color scale to a five-step
scale with a neutral color in the center (see Fig. 8). Based on
the insights we gained from the tests we found that for the
participants, the visualization of the expert knowledge and also
the handling of the KDB was easy to understand and use.
R4 Expert knowledge: As previously mentioned, the KDB tree
was well received by the participants and focus groups
members. Another improvement added as a result of the user
study was the addition of brackets with numbers of included
rules at the end of each node. Additionally, we added a counter
for each type of represented knowledge in the interface (see
Fig. 4.2.f). The industry focus group members noted that the
newly added numbers were helpful for getting a better over-
view of the loaded data. Reflecting on the insights we gained
in the performed tests, we found out that the analysts appre-
ciated and could benefit from the externalized expert knowledge
by sharing and activating or deactivating KDB elements during
the analysis process.
Categorization of KAMAS: If we categorize KAMAS along the
Malware Visualization Taxonomy (Wagner et al., 2015), we can
Fig. 8 – Current three-step color map (left) versus a
suggested five-step color map for knowledge
representation (right). For color-blind users we decided to
select to a diverging red-blue scale (red: = malicious,
blue: = benign). (For interpretation of the references to color
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
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see that KAMAS can be categorized on the one hand as a
Malware Forensics tool which regards to the analysis of ma-
licious software execution traces. On the other hand, KAMAS
can also be categorized as a Malware Classification tool for
malware comparison in relation to the automated analysis.This
automated analysis works on the included call sequences con-
tained in a loaded file and is based on the explicit knowledge
stored in the KDB.
Lessons learned: During this design study, we learned that
explicit knowledge opens the possibility to close the gap between
different categories of malware analysis systems (Wagner et al.,
2015). Thus, it combines features for Malware Forensics and
Malware Classification. In contrast to other malware analysis
systems which build their visual metaphors directly on the
output of the data providers, KAMAS uses an input grammar
generated by a combination of Malheur (Rieck, 2016) and Se-
quitur (Nevill-Manning and Witten, 1997) for cluster and data
classification.Therefore, we use analytical and visual represen-
tation methods to provide a scalable and problem-tailored
visualization solution following the visual analytics agenda (Keim
et al., 2010; Thomas and Cook, 2005). For keeping up with the
large number and dynamic evolution of malware families,
malware analysts need to continuously adapt the settings of their
visualization systems, whereby interactivity is a key strength
of visualization systems. Malware analysis in particular profits
from extensive interaction and annotation features as it is a very
knowledge-intensive job. By providing knowledge-oriented in-
teractions, externalized knowledge can subsequently be used
in the analysis process to improve analysts’ performance.
Transferability:The knowledge generation loop can be gen-
eralized for other domains taking into account domain-
specific data structures and patterns of interest. On a general
level, the workflow for knowledge generation and extraction
is mostly similar and always includes the system user as an
integral part of the loop (Endert et al., 2014). Focusing on n
stepped colored highlighting and easy to understand summa-
rization techniques it is faster and more effective to find
similarities in the data.
In future work, we will extend our research to a different
problem domain (e.g., healthcare) in order to generalize our
results.Therefore, we have to adapt and extend the knowledge-
assisted visualization methods and the interface as necessary
in relation to the users’ needs.
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